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JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken pursuant to Article VIII, Section
5, of the Constitution of the State of Utah; Utah Code Section
78-2-2(3)(i); and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented by this appeal are:
1.

Whether the default judgment of $851,686.05,

which was entered when Appellants were without counsel, is
based upon insufficient and/or incompetent evidence as to
damages of a speculative nature and should therefore be set
aside to allow the Appellant, represented by counsel, to
cross-examine the Respondents* affidavit witnesses and present
evidence in defense of the Respondents' claims.
2.

Whether the trial court's conditioning of

granting of relief from the default entered in this case upon
the payment by the impecunious Appellants of the Respondents
attorneys' fees claimed for obtaining the default, in the
amount of $4,083,185, with a mandatory 30-day deadline, is an
abuse of the court's discretion and a violation of the
Appellant's rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States of America and the Constitution of the State of Utah, as
a denial of due process of law, equal protection of the law and
access to the courts;

-1-

3.

Whether the requirement that the Appellant pay

$4,083.85 to the Respondents as a condition for granting relief
from the default is contrary to general principles of law and
to the case law precedent of the State of Utah;
4.

Whether this Court's decision if Sovereen v.

Meadows, 595 P.2d 852 (1979), is controlling in holding that in
a case such as this it would be an abuse of discretion for the
trial judge to condition the setting aside of a default upon
the payment of attorneys' fees of such a large amount.
5.

Whether the Complaint upon which a default

judgment was entered was defective on its face because, when it
was filed as a separate case in Davis County prior to its
consolidation with this case in Salt Lake County, it
constituted a compulsory counterclaim in this case;
6.

Whether a default judgment can award relief that

is contrary to law and which could not be awarded in a judgment
on a trial of the case on its merits; specifically, whether the
default judgment entered for "unpaid capital contributions to a
partnership" is void because there is no such thing under
partnership law in the State of Utah or elsewhere as an
involuntary capital contribution to a partnership, the remedy
at law for the failure of a partner to respond to a call for
additional capitol being the proportionate reduction of the
non-paying partner's share and not a forced contribution of
additional capitol enforced by the judgment and order of a
court.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is a suit brought in Salt Lake County Third
District Court by the Appellants Roy Bosley and his
wholly-owned corporation, D.C.G., Inc., (hereinafter sometimes
collectively referred to as "Bosley") to collect amounts due
and unpaid by the Respondents, or some of them, for
construction management services provided by Bosley pursuant to
contract; to recover accounting, tax, and other records
belonging to Bosley and held by the Respondents; for an
accounting of partnership profits; and for other relief.
The Respondents, prior to filing an answer to Bosley's
Complaint in Third District Court filed a suit in the Second
District Court of Davis County, based on the same transactions,
occurrences and relationships as the Salt Lake County case,
seeking damages for "unpaid partnership contributions" to an
alleged partnership, damages for alleged cost overruns, delays
and poor workmanship in a construction project, and for
injunctive relief.
After the two cases were consolidated in Salt Lake
County under the earlier filed Salt Lake County case, the
Respondents filed an answer and counterclaim to the Appellant's
Complaint, designating their Davis County Complaint as the
counterclaim, and also filing what they called an "amended
complaint" in the Salt Lake County action, denominating
themselves as plaintiffs and the Appellants as defendants.

The

"amended complaint" was identical to the Davis County Complaint
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and to the counterclaim in Salt Lake County.
While Appellants were without counsel, their counsel
having formally withdrawn from the case, the Respondents caused
a default certificate to be entered on their -amended
complaint," and later moved the court for entry of default
judgment.
The Appellants, now represented by new counsel, moved
to vacate the default certificate.
The court, hearing both motions together, denied the
motion for entry of judgment and granted the motion to set
aside the default, but conditioned on the Appellants9 paying
Respondents attorneys fees incurred in obtaining the default.
The Respondents prepared an order for the courts'
signature awarding themselves over $4,000 in attorneys fees and
making the payment of the fees within 30 days a condition for
setting aside the default.
The Appellants objected to the proposed order on the
grounds, inter alia, that they were impecunious and could not
pay the fees in the 30 days allowed.
The Third District Court entered the order over the
Appellants* objections and, 30 days later when the $4,000 fees
had not been paid, entered judgment by default against the
Appellants for $852,686.05 on the one count and $43,189.21 on
another count.
The Appellants appealed from both the order,
conditioning relief from the default on the payment within 30
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days of the $4,083.85, and from the judgment subsequently
entered of over $850,000.00 for, inter alia, unpaid capital
contributions to a partnership.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 20, 1986, the Appellants Roy Bosley and
his closely held corporation, D.C.G., Inc., originally filed
the case below, Bosley, et al. v. Sprinqwood Associates, et
al., Case No. C87-0336 in the Third Judicial District Court of
Salt Lake County, seeking to collect amounts due and unpaid by
the Respondents, or some of them, for construction management
services provided by Bosley pursuant to contract; to recover
accounting, tax, and other records belonging to Bosley and held
by the Respondents; for an accounting of partnership profits,
and for other relief.
On February 12, 1987, the defendants in the Sprinqwood
case, including the principals, Messrs. Smoot and Kjar, filed
the case of West Evanston Development, et al. v. Bosley, et
al., in the Second District Court of Davis County.

The subject

matter of the Davis County case arose from the same
transactions and occurrences as the previously filed Salt Lake
County case, and the case was seeking damages for "unpaid
partnership contributions- to an alleged partnership, damages
for alleged cost overruns, delays and poor workmanship in a
construction project, and for injunctive relief.
In November of 1987, the cases were consolidated under
Bosley v. Sprinqwood, Case No. C87-0336 in the Third District
Court.
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On December 21, 1987, the Respondents filed an answer
and a counterclaim.

The counterclaim adopted the Davis County

Complaint in its entirety as a counterclaim, they also filed an
"Amended Complaint", identical in all respects to the version
adopted as the counterclaim, as a separate "Amended Complaint",
in the Salt Lake County action denominating themselves as
Plaintiffs and Bosley as Defendant.
On February 1, 1988, Bosley*s then counsel filed a
Notice of Withdrawal in this action.
On March 9, 1988, counsel for the defendants
Springwood Associates, Smoot, Kjar, et al., caused a default
certificate to be entered against Bosley.

This was done while

Bosley was without counsel.
On March 18, 1988, Bosley's present counsel entered
his appearance as attorney for Bosley.
On April 8, 1988, the defendants Springwood
Associates, Smoot, Kjar, et al., filed a Motion for Entry of
Default Judgment on their "Amended Complaint."
On May 3, 1988, Bosley filed his Motion to Set Aside
the Default Judgment.
On May 6, 1988, the Third District Court, Hon. Richard
H. Moffat heard the motion of Springwood Associates, Smoot,
Kjar, et al., for Entry of Default Judgment and the Motion of
Bosley to Set Aside the Default.

The court denied the Motion

for Entry of Judgment, granted the Motion to Set Aside the
Default and awarded attorney's fees to the
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Defendants-Counterclaimants, Springwood, Smoot, Kjar, et al.
On June 17, 1988, the court heard Bosley's Objection
to the Proposed Order prepared by counsel for Springwood,
Smoot, Kjar, et al., on the grounds that the attorney's fees
awarded in the proposed order were excessive, and that the
requirement in the proposed Order that the awarded attorney's
fees be paid within 30 days as a condition to the setting aside
of the Default was beyond the scope of Judge Moffat's ruling at
the hearing on the Motions for Default Judgment and to Set
Aside Default, and that the requirement of the payment of such
a large fee as a condition to filing an answer to an $850,000
default judgment was manifestly unfair.
On August 27, Judge Moffat issued his Decision on the
Motions, which was entered as a Minute Entry by the court on
August 29, 1988. The decision held that " . . . the court
awards attorney's fees in the sum of $4,803.85 to the
above-named plaintiffs [Defendants-Counterclaimants?] and the
payment of such is ordered within 30 days from the date hereof
as a precondition to granting the order setting the defaults."
On September 9, 1988, Judge Richard Moffat signed an
order prepared by counsel for Springwood, Smoot, Kjar, et al.,
which was entered by the clerk of the court on September 12,
1988.
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS;
ORDINANCES OR RULES
RULE 55(c)
For good cause shown, the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default
has been entered, may likewise set it aside in
accordance with Rule 60(b).
RULE 60(b)
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; . . . or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. . . .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants contend that it is an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to make the paying of attorney's fees a
condition for setting aside a default in a case where the court
has determined that it is proper to set aside the default, and
the amount of the required attorney's fees is so large that an
impecunious defendant can neither pay the required attorney's
fees, nor raise the required amount in the period of time
prescribed by the court's order.

Setting impossible or

extremely difficult financial conditions, with respect to
amount and time of payment, as a prerequisite to the setting
aside of a default to allow a party who was not represented by
counsel when the default was entered to assert claimed
defenses, amounts to an unconsitutional denial of access to the
courts to persons with limited funds, and is not in accordance

7.1

with the purpose of the rules governing default judgments and
not in accordance with the case law of the State of Utah.
The Appellants also contend that a plaintiff ought not
to be able to obtain a judgment by default which would be
unattainable in a trial on the merits of the case.

The

complaint upon which the default judgment in this case was
based was filed when the subject matter of the complaint
constituted a compulsory counterclaim in a suit filed by the
opposing party previously in another county, and asks for a
court enforced mandatory capital contribution on the part of a
partner, in contravention of the partnership agreement and
general principles of law.

7.2

ARGUMENT
I.

WHEN A DEFAULT IS ENTERED AGAINST AN IMPECUNIOUS
PARTY WHO IS NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL . IT IS AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE COURT TO CONDITION
THE GRANTING OF RELIEF FROM THE DEFAULT UPON THE
PAYMENT WITHIN 3 0 DAYS OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN
EXCESS OF $4,000.

It has long been the policy of this Court that doubts
should be resolved in favor of setting aside default judgments
to permit parties to have their day in court.

Unless there are

unusual circumstances present, it is inequitable and unjust to
condemn a party unheard.
303 P.2d 995 (1956).

Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415,

The purpose of the default judgments is

not to settle disputes by determining only which party is more
diligent in following procedural rules, but rather to provide
an efficient mechanism for avoiding delay when there is no
genuine resistance to the claims of the plaintiff on the part
of the defendant, and to provide a self-executing disciplinary
device for enforcing obedience to the authority of served
process.
Where the defendant has valid defenses which he
desires to assert, default judgment serves no purpose.

Where

the defendant is not "thumbing his noseH at the authority of
the process of the court, but rather, retains counsel to defend
him, punishing the defendant by default judgment is misplaced
discipline.

And when the defendant's retained counsel, who has

neglected for months to file an answer to the plaintiffs
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Complaint, dumps his client for failure to keep up the pace on
payment of fees, and then counsel for the plaintiff takes
advantage of the situation to have a default certificate
entered in the gap while the defendant is without counsel, a
failure of the court to set aside the default on the
application of the defendant's replacement counsel would be
manifest abuse of the discretion of the court.
This Court has held that it is an abuse of discretion
for a trial court to refuse to vacate a default judgment where
timely application is made and there is any reasonable grounds
for doing so.

Chrysler v. Chrysler, id.; Ney v. Harrison, 5

Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114; Bvlund v. Cook. 60 Utah 285, 208 P.
504.
In the instant case, counsel for Appellants entered
his appearance in the case without knowing that counsel for the
Respondents had caused a default certificate to be entered in
the case only days before, without notice to the Appellant or
Appellants' prior counsel.

When subsequently counsel for the

Respondents noticed their motion for entry of judgment on the
default, counsel for Appellants immediately filed the motion to
set aside the default.

There can be no question as to

timeliness; the motion to set aside the default and the motion
for entry of judgment were heard at the same time.
The grounds for setting aside a default judgment
include those listed in Rules 55(c) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure: Mgood cause" for setting aside a default,
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and, if a judgment has been entered, "any . . . reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment,"
including mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect•

Ample

grounds were given in the Appellant's Motion to Set Aside The
Default, and the trial court properly found sufficient grounds
and granted the motion.
The conditioning of the granting of relief from the
default on the payment, within 30 days, of attorneys' fees in
an amount greater than the Appellants could raise, however,
effectively took away the relief from the default which the
trial court, by granting the motion, found was proper in the
case.
A court in granting a motion to open or vacate a
judgment may, within reasonable limits, impose terms.
2d, Judgments, § 784 at 945.

46 AmJur

Courts have divided on the issue

of whether the payment of costs can be a condition precedent to
an order opening a default.

Id.

Courts holding that the

imposition as a condition to vacating a default judgment of the
requirement that the defaulting party pay a proper fee to the
opposing party's counsel hold that the fee award must be
reasonable,

id. at 946.

If the fee is so large that the

defaulting party cannot pay it, then the amount of the fee, as
a pre-condition to setting aside the default, is manifestly
unreasonable.

The fee may be "reasonable" in the sense that it

is related to the amount of work done by counsel for the
non-defaulting party, and, as such, could properly be added to
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the judgment after the trial of the case in the event that the
non-defaulting party becomes the prevailing party.

But this

does not make the fee a reasonable condition to setting aside a
default.

A claimed attorneys' fee may be reasonably related to

the amount of hours spent by attorneys working on the case, and
still be a totally unreasonable amount to require be paid
within 30 days of impecunious parties who file, as they did in
the instant case, affidavits attesting to their inability to
pay.
A leading Utah case in point is Pitts v. Pine Meadow
Ranch, Inc., 589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978).

In Pitts, this Court

stated that, in considering whether to set aside a default
judgment, the district court should exercise its discretion
liberally in favor of the defendant unless such exercise would
result in injustice or inequity to the plaintiff, and condition
the setting aside of a default judgment on the payment of
certain costs because those costs would directly result from
the setting aside of the default judgment.

In order for the

matter to be heard, in the event that the default was set
aside, the plaintiffs in Pitts, would have to return to this
country from England, a large cost directly related to setting
aside the default, which cost could be a hardship and inequity
to the plaintiffs.

In the instant case, in contrast, the only

hardship is to the law firm representing the Respondents, if
delaying an award of attorneys fees until the entry of Judgment
can property be termed a hardship.

-11-

It is also important to note at this juncture that,
unlike Pitts, or the cases discussed in the above AmJur
annotation, the motion to set aside the default in this case
was made before judgment was entered.

The motion of the

Appellants to set aside the entry of default was made as soon
as the fact of the entry of default was made known by the
attorneys for the Respondents.

The motion could have been

heard and decided prior to the Respondents1 motion for judgment
costs of $4,000 (plus) had been incurred.

If the cost of

presenting their motion for judgment had been a hardship or an
inequity upon the Respondents, they could have easily avoided
such hardship by postponing the hearing on their motion for
judgment on the default until after the Appellants' motion to
set aside the default had been heard and decided by the trial
court.
II.

A DEFAULT JUDGMENT MAY NOT PROPERLY AWARD RELIEF
WHICH WOULD NOT BE PROPER IN A JUDGMENT ENTERED
AFTER TRIAL OF THE CASE ON ITS MERITS: JUDGMENT
BY DEFAULT AWARDING DAMAGES FOR AN UNPAID CAPITAL
CONTRIBUTION TO A PARTNERSHIP IS IMPROPER BECAUSE
NO SUCH REMEDY EXISTS UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE
OF UTAH, OR ELSEWHERE.

In Sovereen v. Meadows. 595 P.2d 852 (Utah 1979), this
Court held that where the failure to state a claim appeared
clearly on the face of the Complaint, it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial judge to condition setting aside of a
default judgment on the defendant's paying attorney's fees.
If, in other words, the plaintiff could not get the relief
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prayed for after a trial, he should not be able to get that
same relief by default.
In the instant case, there are two defects which are
apparent on the face of the Complaint.

One, the Complaint upon

which the default was entered, and upon which judgment was
entered, was filed in Davis County after the commencement of
the Appellants' case against the Respondents in Salt Lake
County.

The subject matter of the Complaint arose from the

same transactions and occurrences as that of the Salt Lake
County action, and therefore, the Davis County Complaint
constituted a compulsory counterclaim in the Salt Lake County
action.

The Appellants should not have had to answer that

Complaint at all; rather, the Rules of Civil Procedure
contemplate that the Respondents' claims be filed as a
counterclaim and dealt with by the Appellant in a reply to a
counterclaim in the existing action, in which both parties were
already "in court".

Had the Appellants, when they were without

counsel, failed to timely respond to the Respondents'
counterclaim, that could have been dealt with appropriately as
needed by the Court in the action which was already joined.
Entering a Default Judgment of close to $900,000 on a "Amended
Complaint" which was, itself, improperly filed, would not have
been the appropriate way for the court to deal with the
tardiness of the then unrepresented Appellant in responding to
a counterclaim.
The second facial defect of the Respondents' "Amended
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Complaint" is that it requests that the Court award a remedy
which is contrary to law, and unavailable; a forced-compulsory
capital contribution by a partner to a partnership.

There is

simply no such thing at law or equity in this jurisdiction or
any other.
The judgment in this case includes an amount of
$94,000 to reimburse the West Evanston Development Partnership
for amounts that the partnership borrowed because the
Appellants did not respond affirmatively to the request of the
partnership that it increase its capital account by $94,000.
In other words, when the partnership was unsuccessful in
obtaining new capital from the Appellants, they had to borrow
elsewhere.

Even if the Bosley had an obligation to provide

additional funding to the partnership, which he did not, the
measure of damages for not doing so would not be the full
$94,000 which the partnership claims it had to borrow.

As it

is, neither the Appellant nor any other partner in any business
partnership has, in the absence of a specific agreement to do
so.

The West Evanston Development Joint Venture Agreement

itself provides that the other partners may contribute the
non-contributing partner's share of a capital call in which
case they will be entitled to reimbursement and interest
payable only from the non-contributing partner's share of net
receipts or funds available for distribution and then only to a
limited extent.

See paragraph 6.3 of Exhibit "A" to Complaint

in West Evanston Development, et al. v. Bosley, et al.. Second
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District Court Case No. CV-40931.

There cannot be any

obligation to put up additional capital in amounts unforeseen
at the time the partnership was formed.

Yet, that is exactly

what $94,000 worth of the judgment is for.
-Damages in the amount of $94,060 for capital
borrowed by W.E.D. to cover capital calls made
to, but unpaid by, Bosley." Plaintiffs* Amended
Motion For Entry Of Default Judgment, p. 4.
Under the law of partnerships in the State of Utah and
elsewhere, if a partner is unable or unwilling to contribute
additional capital to the partnership in response to a capital
"call'1, while other partners do respond to the capital call and
contribute additional capital, the percentage of ownership of
the non-contributing partner is adjusted downward to reflect
the ratio of his capital account to the total capital of the
partnership as increased by the contributions of those partners
responding to the capital call.

There is no such thing as a

mandatory capital contribution.

If the non-contributing

partner continues to fail to respond to repeated needs for
additional capital, as determined by the partnership majority,
then his percentage ownership in the partnership continues to
go down as other partners make contributions of additional
capital which he does not match.

But, the non-contributing

partner does not become liable and subject to a judgment at law
for all amounts which the majority decides he should contribute
in addition to his original investment, and no valid judgment,
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by default or otherwise, can be based upon such a false notion
of partnership accounting and partnership law.

See generally.

Agency and Partnership, Reuschlein and Gregory's Handbook On
The Law Of, 1979, West Publishing Company.
There are additional problems with the judgment.
. . the amount of $232,545.55 for costs to repair damage to
W.E.D.'s 'Pines of Yellow Creek' Apartment Complex . . ."
Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Default, Q&. Cit., p. 4 does
not represent an actual cost of repairing any actual damage,
but is the affidavit opinion of an "expert", not subjected to
qualification as an expert, and not subject to
cross-examination; "Damages in the amount of $525,080.50 for
cost overruns which occurred due to Bosley's and D.C.G.9s
negligent and mismanaged construction of the project," (ill. pp.
4 and 5) is added to the judgment in spite of the fact that the
contract of Bosley and D.C.G., the Appellants herein, with
regard to that particular project, does not make Bosley and
D.C.G. a general contractor nor a construction manager on the
project but is, rather, for construction consulting services.
See Exhibit "C" to the Complaint in West Evanston Development,
et al. v. Bosley, et al.. Second District Court Case No.
CV-40931, especially 1[ "C" of the "Recitals":

D.C.G. . . . is

engaged in providing development and construction management
consulting services."

These matters can be addressed, and

evidence presented, when the case is tried.

16-

CONCLUSION
Because it is an abuse of the trial court's discretion
to grant a default judgment of approximately $900,000 against
an impecuious party because he fails to pay, within 30 days,
attorneys fees in excess of $4,000, in a case where the court
has found that it is proper to set aside the entry of default
against that party; and because a default judgment should not
award relief to the non-defaulting party which is contrary to
law and which could not properly be awarded to that party after
a trial of the case, and the request for which renders the
Complaint or other pleading of the non-defaulting party void on
its face, it is respectfully submitted that the Order and
Judgment appealed from should be reversed, and this matter
remanded to the District Court for trial.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of May, 1989.

EDWARD J. MCDONOUGH
^
50 South Main Street, #1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
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